A fourth OPCW whistleblower has emerged to defend the two veteran inspectors who challenged a cover-up of the chemical weapons probe in Douma, Syria. The new whistleblower lamented that other staffers have been “frightened into silence.” 

By Aaron Mate

https://thegrayzone.com/2020/03/12/opcw-whistleblower-mistreatment-douma-investigators/

12.03.20 A new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) whistleblower has surfaced in response to a malicious and factually flawed attack by OPCW leadership on two veteran inspectors who challenged the official story of an alleged chemical attack by the Syrian government in Douma. 

In a statement provided to The Grayzone, the new OPCW whistleblower described being “horrified” by the “abhorrent … mistreatment” of the inspectors. The new whistleblower also warned of a climate of intimidation designed to keep other staffers “frightened into silence.”

The official is now the fourth OPCW whistleblower to air serious concerns about the chemical watchdog’s Douma probe. The Grayzone has independently verified the official’s identity and status with the OPCW, and granted them anonymity to protect them from potential retaliation.

Their full emailed statement can be seen here, and is transcribed at the conclusion of this article.

The first two whistleblowers – the inspectors – are veteran OPCW experts and team leaders who deployed to Syria in April 2018. A third staffer has dissented from the official version of events, but declined to make their views public out of fear that they and their family would be harmed.

The findings by the first two whistleblowing inspectors severely undermined allegations by Western nations and Syrian opposition groups that the Syrian government carried out a chemical attack in Douma.

However, OPCW leadership excluded their scientific work, re-wrote their initial report, and barred them from adding any further input to the investigation. The inspectors’ evidence and the high-level campaign to bury it came to light through a series of leaks that began in May 2019. OPCW leadership has retaliated against the two by falsely portrayed them as rogue actors with only minor roles in the investigation and incomplete information.

The statement by the new OPCW whistleblower forcefully defends the inspectors and denounces the campaign by organization leadership to destroy their reputations.

“The mistreatment of two highly regarded and accomplished professionals can only be described as abhorrent,” the OPCW official wrote. “I fully support their endeavours, in that it is for the greater good and not for personal gain or in the name of any political agenda. They are in fact trying to protect the integrity of the organisation which has been hijacked and brought into shameful disrepute.”

One of the two whistleblowing former inspectors has been identified publicly. He is Ian Henderson, a 12-year veteran of the organization and weapons expert. Henderson led on-the-ground inspections in Douma and conducted a detailed engineering study of gas cylinders found at the scene. He concluded that the cylinders were likely “manually placed” rather than being dropped by air – a finding that suggests the attack was staged on the ground by the militants who controlled Douma at the time.

The OPCW buried Henderson’s study and released a final report that echoed the version put forward by the US Department of State and British Foreign Ministry, strongly implying that the cylinders were dropped by the Syrian military.

The second inspector has not identified themself, and is known only as Inspector B. This person is a 16-year OPCW veteran who coordinated the OPCW team’s scientific and technical activities in Douma and was the chief author of the main report – until OPCW leaders seized control of the investigation and rewrote its findings.

In remarks last month, OPCW Director-General General Fernando Arias dismissed the pair’s scientific work as “erroneous, uninformed, and wrong,” and insisted that they “could not accept that their views were not backed by evidence.”

In letters published by The Grayzone, the inspectors rebutted Arias’ claims and argued, in B’s words, that they in fact “could never accept that a scientific investigation is not backed by science.”

The new OPCW whistleblower stood by the inspectors. “It is quite unbelievable that valid scientific concerns are being brazenly ignored in favour of a predetermined narrative,” they wrote. “The lack of transparency in an investigative process with such enormous ramifications is frightful.”

The official went on to suggest that fear of retaliation is preventing more OPCW officials from coming forward. “I am one of many who were stunned and frightened into silence by the reality how the organisation operates,” the official wrote. “The threat of personal harm is not an illusion, or else many others would have spoken out by now.” The official does not provide additional details.

Another OPCW veteran, who served in a senior role but no longer works at the organization, has also warned of severe threats to their security. In a letter published by The Grayzone, the former senior OPCW official expressed alarm about a cover-up of the Douma probe and of the intimidation of dissenting voices. The former official described their tenure at the OPCW as “the most stressful and unpleasant ones of my life,” and voiced concern that “they will not hesitate to do harm to me and my family.”

In their rebuttal letter to Arias, Inspector B complained that Arias’ public statements have left “so many obvious clues, that anyone within the Organisation (and among many delegations) would have no doubt as to [the whistleblower’s] identities. Such recklessness has created a serious safety concern.”

According to the inspectors, a delegation of US officials visited the OPCW to apply “unacceptable pressure” on the Douma team to place blame on the Syrian government for a chemical attack that might not have happened at all. 

Both Henderson and Inspector B have called on Arias to allow for a transparent, scientific hearing where all of the suppressed evidence and studies can be heard. In their statement, the new OPCW whistleblower echoed the inspectors’ demand.

“The lack of transparency in an investigative process with such enormous ramifications is frightful,” the official wrote. “The allegations of the two gentlemen urgently need to be thoroughly investigated and the functionality of the organisation restored.”

Full text of statement on Douma scandal from new OPCW whistleblower

As an employee of the OPCW I was horrified and simultaneously unsurprised by recent events in the organisation. The mistreatment of two highly regarded and accomplished professionals can only be described as abhorrent. I fully support their endeavours, in that it is for the greater good and not for personal gain or in the name of any political agenda. They are in fact trying to protect the integrity of the organisation which has been hijacked and brought into shameful disrepute.

Unfortunately this is not a recent occurrence but a continuation of how the previous Director General and management group were operating. Working in the organisation has been an eye-opener and the cause of deep professional shame when I became aware of how a key element of the organisation was and clearly continues to be mismanaged. I am one of many who were stunned and frightened into silence by the reality how the organisation operates. The threat of personal harm is not an illusion, or else many others would have spoken out by now.

There is still no mechanism at the organisation to enable the calling out of irregular behaviour to protect the integrity of the organisation. It is quite unbelievable that valid scientific concerns are being brazenly ignored in favour of a predetermined narrative. The lack of transparency in an investigative process with such enormous ramifications is frightful. The allegations of the two gentlemen urgently need to be thoroughly investigated and the functionality of the organisation restored.

Khaled Iskef
21st Century Wire

The Syrian state, through its specialized service directorates, has begun the work of opening the M5 international highway which connects Aleppo to Lattakia, in preparation for the implementation of the Russian-Turkish agreement recently concluded by Presidents Putin and Erdogan in Moscow.

On Tuesday, specialized workers began to remove the barriers that were blocking the road from the Syrian state’s regions of Lattakia governorate on the Syrian coast, and repair and rehabilitation works for the international highway were carried out within sections controlled by the Syrian state forces.

Government sources have indicated that the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is now fully committed to the ceasefire outlined in the agreement, noting that removing the barriers from the road demonstrates the commitment of the Syrian state to the prescribed terms, despite all the violations committed by terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham aka “HTS” (former known as al-Nusra Front, aka al-Qaeda in Syria) and its allied factions since the activation of the new agreement midnight last Thursday.

In the same context, the number of breaches committed by HTS reached to about 40 from Thursday to Tuesday morning, with Lattakia governorate received the largest share of these breaches as a result of the drones launched by the HTS and allied militants targeting the Russian military base at Hmeimim, followed by incursions in Aleppo and Idlib governorates.

It is noteworthy that HTS had announced, in an official statement issued a few days ago, its rejection of the “Moscow Agreement” and its refusal to abide by it as it did in previous agreements, especially that the agreement included an affirmation of fighting designated terrorist organizations listed by the UN Security Council.

It should also be noted that one of the most prominent provisions of the Russian-Turkish agreement is the issue of opening the international highway that links the cities of Aleppo and Lattakia, provided that the safe buffer zones from the militant-controlled areas through which the road passes by is 6 kilometers to the north and 6 kilometers to the south. This necessarily means the withdrawal of the armed factions from several important cities, namely Areha and Jisr al-Shughour, but still no signs of implementation appear to have been recorded.

Until militant groups begin to recede from those positions which threaten the stability of the M5 highway, then further violent clashes can be expected.https://21stcenturywire.com/2020/03/11/despite-al-nusra-breaches-syria-and-russia-working-to-open-m5-highway/

Source: Mideast Discourse
Steven Sahiounie, political commentator

Turkish backed terrorists, following Radical Islam, which is a political ideology, have shot down a Syrian military helicopter in Idlib on Tuesday. The battlefield of Idlib sits poised for imminent war. President Tayyip Erdogan said on Tuesday the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad would pay a “very heavy price” for attacking Turkish troops, as he threatened war against Syria after five Turkish soldiers were killed on Monday and an additional eight earlier.

The situation rose to a fever pitch on Monday as the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) attacked an observation post manned by the Turkish Army in Taftanaz, northeast of Idlib. The SAA is on a mission to clear the Idlib province of all Al Qaeda linked terrorists, which are backed by Erdogan, and others. In addition to the terrorists who occupy Idlib, Turkey has sent into Idlib large numbers of Turkish soldiers, as well as Syrian armed militias living in Turkey, such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF). Turkey is an invasion force, while the SAA fights to defend their country.

Witnesses on the border reported large convoys of Turkish military hardware, troops, and armored vehicles crossing into Syria in an almost continuous procession.

The terrorists and their Turkish backers have insisted on using the civilians as a bargaining chip in the battles. Turkey, the UN, and most of the international community warn of a humanitarian disaster if the civilians are driven north from Idlib during battles to regain control of Idlib, the last remaining area in Syria under terrorist control. For weeks, the Syrian Red Crescent ambulances, food trucks, and green buses sat empty and waiting along the humanitarian corridor of exit from Idlib, and an only small number came out and told of being threatened by the terrorists and generally prevented from escaping their occupation to safe areas in Syria.

The Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria was Jibhat al Nusra, and when they entered the cluttered Syrian battlefield in 2013, they were soon recognized as the fiercest and most violent of all the armed fighting groups. The Free Syrian Army (FSA), backed by the USA had failed to garner civilian support of their Jihad for “Regime Change”, and failed to recruit Syrian civilians to take up arms and join their ranks. After Jibhat al Nusra arrived, the FSA either joined their ranks or deserted the cause and migrated to Germany in the summer of 2015 exodus.

The US and others designated Jibhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization, which made supporting them an illegal act and punishable. Jibhat al Nusra then re-branded as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and is supported by Turkey and other countries. HTS has worked with ISIS in certain instances in the past.

Idlib is the last terrorist occupied area in Syria, and the only region to have been under their control since 2012. Designated as a de-escalation zone in 2017, terrorists who refused to lay down their arms in battle zones across Syria were given the option of peacefully leaving on Green Buses to Idlib.

The civilians trapped in Idlib are in many cases, there by choice. The Green Buses offered as an alternative to resuming their past lives across Syria, was offered to armed terrorists and their immediate family, extended family, and others who share the Muslim Brotherhood dogma, which seeks to establish an Islamic ‘utopia’ in Syria. Some of these civilians are Syrian and some are Chinese citizens, who were imported personally by Erdogan, as his secret “Turkic” weapon. They are ethnic Uyghurs from China, who are a member of the Jihadist group Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

The original Idlib residents are scattered: some to Europe, some to Turkey, some to Latakia and the safety of the coast. Those homeowners, landowners and business owners of Idlib who are living as refugees, or displaced persons, are following events in Idlib and hoping to return one day and take up their rightful possessions, and begin anew.

Leila has been living in Latakia since 2012, and cleaning houses to support her family. Her husband had been a farmer in Idlib, but when the terrorists arrived they began planting land mines in farmland, and civilians were killed while farming. Leila and her family left Idlib and have never gone back. “Our land and olive trees are waiting for us. Our house was probably used by the terrorists, but we hope we can reclaim it one day,” she said.

In 2018 an agreement was reached between Turkey and Russia, and Turkey promised to remove all Al Qaeda terrorists, and to move all unarmed civilians to safe areas, thus separating the innocent, from the guilty. Russia promised to assist the SAA in fighting terrorists, which is part of the global war on terror.

However, Turkey never fulfilled their promise to the agreement, which made the situation unsustainable. In early 2019 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov commented on the Turkish-Russian agreement about Idlib, and the disturbing news that some Western countries wanted to preserve Idlib as a safe-haven for terrorists. “There’s been news that some Western countries wish to do precisely that. They want this enclave where Jabhat al-Nusra (terrorist group outlawed in Russia) controls more than 90% of the territory to become a participant in the future political process,” Lavrov stated at a news conference. “It is clear that there can be no talks with terrorists. Our Western counterparts have repeatedly demonstrated double standards, so I cannot rule out that the information I’ve mentioned is well-founded.”

A Russian delegation headed by Sergey Vershinin, deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of Syrian affairs, and Alexander Lavrentiev, the special envoy of the Russian presidency to Syria, met with Turkish officials in Ankara recently on two occasions but failed to agree.

The Turkish are waiting for a visit from James Jeffrey, the US special representative for Syria, on Wednesday before announcing a plan to reclaim territories the Syrian government has taken over since December last year.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said earlier that the Russian and Turkish militaries had again attempted to declare a ceasefire, but terrorists just stepped up their attacks. In response, the Syrian army launched a counterattack against the terrorists

Turkey set up 12 observation posts in Idlib province after an agreement with Russia in 2018; however, recently three of the observation posts were surrounded by SAA. Turkey invaded Syria and insisted on establishing military outposts, which were supposed to be observation towers, to facilitate their promised plan to separate terrorists from unarmed civilians. This ruse was effectively used by Turkey to dig-in and defend the terrorists, who follow the same Muslim Brotherhood ideology as does President Erdogan, and his AK Party.

Turkey hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees and insists it cannot take in any more. “Russia and Assad are still pushing ahead with this offensive despite the fact Ankara has reiterated its red lines because they underestimate how vital stability in Idlib is for Turkey. Keeping the border shut is a huge national security concern,” said Dareen Khalifa, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group.

In late 2019 the Syrian government announced a strategic goal to recapture and secure the M4 highway, linking the international Port of Latakia, with Aleppo, the economic hub of Syria, and to accomplish the same with the M5 highway, linking Aleppo, Damascus, and Jordan. This goal is an economic imperative for Syria which is still manufacturing goods, and growing agricultural products used domestically and for export. The battle to clear Idlib of terrorists is crucial to the economic recovery of Syria. On February 8 the SAA captured the strategic town of Saraqeb, which is located at the junction of M4 and M5.

The terrorists in Idlib are well supplied, trained and have seemingly unlimited weapons and munitions. They have been attacking residential areas in Kessab, Latakia, Mahardeh, Hama, and western Aleppo consistently since 2012. The unarmed civilians who are killed, maimed and live in constant fear of a missile attack emanating from Idlib are the real victims.

Source: Mideast Discourse
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan earlier expressed readiness to retaliate after its servicemen were killed in the province of Idlib in an attack by Syrian government forces.

The General Staff of the Syrian army said it gives one last chance to the militants operating in the province of Idlib to lay down their arms, Ikhbariya news agency reported on Tuesday citing a military source, adding that the Syrian Army was ready to repel any Turkish aggression in the province.

“Our armed forces are trying to give the last chance to the militants and save the lives of the besieged civilians. The army units operating in the region have been ordered to allow those who decide not to rely on the support of the Turkish forces, to surrender their weapons”, the source said.

The source added that the Syrian Army was continuing its military operation against the militants, who have been fighting civilians and using them as “shields” in Saraqib and Tell Touqan in Idlib.

On 3 February, the Turkish Defence Ministry said that six Turkish servicemen had been killed in an attack by the Syrian Army in Idlib.

The Turkish military presence in Syria has never been sanctioned either by Damascus nor the UN Security Council. Turkey says its forces are deployed in the region in order to prevent conflicts in Idlib.

Fighting has escalated in Syria’s Idlib recently, as the Syrian government has been struggling to recapture control over the area, which remains a major terrorist stronghold in the country.

Idlib is home to various militant factions, with a large portion of it controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front*), the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda*.

Source: AH Tribune
With the defeat of ISIS and Nusra, the exposure of the ‘White Helmets’ and the various Chemical Weapons stunts, and with the collapse of ‘Rojava’, Washington is fast running out of options in Syria. Syria is winning, but the big power has not yet given up. Knowing that it is losing, it still acts to prolong the endgame and punish the Syrian people.

We are sitting at a joint military command center in Arima (northern Syria, just west of Manbij) with three Syrian Arab Army (SAA) colonels and two uniformed Kurd SDF ‘koval’ (comrades). There are Russians here too, but they do not enter our conversation. Yet even in the friendly chat, as we wait for permission to travel on to Manbij and Ayn al Arab (Kobane), some tensions are apparent.

Sharing coffee and food, both the SAA officers and the SDF comrades acknowledge they are fighting and dying together against an invading Turkish army and its proxy militias. The frontline is just a few kilometers away.

When I ask what differences there are between DAESH, Nusra and the ‘Free Army’, they all respond derisively. “There is no difference, it is a money game, the fighters go back and forwards depending on the pay rates”. “Any difference between groups in the numbers of foreigners?” I suggest. “No difference”, they repeat. SDF Comrade B passes me a recent video of ‘Free Army’ fighters at Tal Abiad, to the north-east, protesting conditions and demanding their return to HTS/Nusra controlled Idlib.

But we all know they fight for a different cause. The SAA officers are fighting for a liberated and united Syria, while the SDF comrades still dream of an independent ‘Kurdistan’ by cutting out parts of contemporary Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

Separatist Kurds collaborated with US occupation forces in pursuit of their ‘Rojava’ dream (western Kurdistan), even though Washington never really supported the project. Many Syrians see them as traitors. But the SAA is patient, dealing with one enemy at a time, and at the moment the enemy in north Syria is Erdogan.

The ‘Rojava’ dream is effectively dead. As both Afrin (in March 2018) and Manbij (in October 2019) demonstrated, no Kurdish militia can defend itself from Ankara, which correctly sees any ‘Rojava’ statelet as a stepping stone for the bigger game, a large slice of Turkey. Protection by US occupation forces could not last forever. Moreover, Kurdish groups have no exclusive historical claims over any parts of northern Syria. Many others live there. In much of north Syria Kurds are a small minority.

Despite these tensions a close, even affectionate relationship remains in the room. The SAA colonels are all older men, in their 40s and 50s, while the SDF comrades are younger men, around 30 years old. Colonel H offers more coffee to Comrade A while Comrade B tells of Kurdish conquests. “We lost 850 martyrs liberating Manbij”, he says, and “2,000 in Kobane”. And what about all those in your prisons? one of the colonels asks. “They are reformatories”, Comrade B replies.
What Comrade B does not say about the “liberation” of Manbij is that (1) the 2016 battle was effectively a transfer of the city from one US proxy (ISIS/DAESH) to another (SDF), and (2) there were very few Kurds in that mostly Arab city. After the major battles, many from surrounding areas fled to the city, swelling its population. A recent estimate puts its population at 700,000, of which 80% are Arab (Najjar 2019). Of the rest there are other non-Arab minorities, including Assyrians, Circassians and Armenians. There is no real social base for a separatist Kurd regime in Manbij.

Yet even after the departure of US occupation forces from this part of northern Syria, and even though the Syrian and Russian presence constrains Turkish ambitions, the SDF has been allowed to maintain its former administration of both the city and the region.

The bizarre and unsustainable nature of this regime is made apparent when Nihad Roumieh, my Syrian journalist colleague, asks one of the colonels to show us where we are. Colonel A happily rolls out a military map, with friend and enemy troop placements. The first thing apparent is that six Syrian armored units protect Manbij, to the north. Second, although Syrian forces have resumed control of more than 200km of the northern border, it is depressing to see how much of northern Syria remains occupied by Erdogan and his proxies.

The picture seemed even more grim when we later spoke with a Manbij councilor and his lawyer friend. They complained of many held in prison and tortured, under the SDF regime. They said there were only two Kurd villages in Manbij.

Nevertheless, it seems that a transition is taking place. Over November-December both Syrian and Russian flags were raised over previous SDF positions in Hassakah, Ayn al Arab, Jarablus and Tal Jemaa (Syrian Observer 2019; Semenov 2019; SOHR 2019), with suggestions that the SDF was involved in negotiations with Damascus “to reach conclusive solutions”. However, SDF leader Mazloum Abadi said that the group wanted “Syrian unity … [with] decentralized self-administration” including maintenance of the separate SDF militia (Syrian Observer 2019). Damascus is unlikely to accept such terms.

****************

The claim for a Kurdish homeland in Syria is no indigenous movement, claiming the return of ancestral lands. Nor does the debate over Kurds as historical migrants (in Yildiz 2005) or long-standing inhabitants (Hennerbichler 2012: 77-78) resolve the question. While Kurdish languages are of Iranian origin, and the longer history passes through Mesopotamia (Iraq) and the Ottoman Empire, Kurds are certainly part of the native Syrian population. However at 1.5 million Syria hosts the smallest group in the region, with around 20 million in Turkey (Gürbüz 2016: 31) and another 6-8 million each in Iran and Iraq.

The idea of a ‘Rojava’ statelet in Syria has been compromised in three ways. First, the Kurdish groups in the north and north-east Syria are only one of several groups (amongst Assyrians, Circassians, Armenians and Arabs), and in some areas small minorities. Second, the Kurdish separatist movement in Syria has been over-determined by the politics of and migration from Turkey. ‘Rojava’ was seen as the stepping stone for a larger ‘Kurdistan’ project, driven from the north. Third, intervention by the imperial power raised separatist expectations and has damaged Kurdish relations with other Syrian groups.

In the longer history of Syria, a traditional refuge for minorities, there have been many Kurds, including famous personalities, who did not buy into the separatist dream. Two of them are buried inside the grounds of the Ummayad Mosque in Damascus: the 12th-century ruler Sala’addin and the Quranic scholar Sheikh Mohammad al Bouti (murdered by Jabhat al Nusra in 2013). Many Syrians of Kurdish origin embraced the idea of a wider identity. Before the 2011 conflict Tejel (2009: 39-46) classified Syrian Kurdish identities as comprising Arab nationalist, communist and Kurdish nationalist, with Syrian Kurd leaders Husni Za’im and Adib al-Shishakli campaigning for a non-sectarian ‘Greater Syria’.

The Turkish Kurd influence began early in the 20th century, as Kurdish culture was repressed by the post-Ottoman Turkish state. Turkish Kurds first took refuge in Syria, including in Damascus, after their failed rebellion in 1925. The very idea of a Syrian Kurdish party first came in 1956 from the Turkish refugee Osman Sabri; and another Turkish refugee Nûredîn Zaza, became president of that party (al Kati 2019: 45, 47).

There were multiple splits in subsequent years. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) emerged in the 1980s as a branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), loyal to its leader Abdallah Öcalan, who in 1996 acknowledged that “most of the Kurds of Syria were refugees and migrants from Turkey and they would benefit from returning there” (in Allsop 2014: 231). Many of the claims about ‘stateless’ Kurds in Syria have to be read in light of this Turkish influx. However, Öcalan departed in 1998, as part of Syria’s Adana agreement with Turkey (al Kati 2019: 49-52).

The big powers, conscious of the potentially divisive role of separatist Kurds, have used them for decades, to divide and weaken Arab governments. US regional allies Israel and Iran (pre-1979) joined in, with the Shah in 1962 ordering his SAVAK secret police to help finance the Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq, so as to undermine Baghdad. The Israelis joined in two years later. The CIA offered further help to the Barzani-led Kurds in 1972. One result was that Iraq was unable to join the Arab resistance against Israeli expansion in 1967 and 1973 because a large part of its military was deployed in northern Iraq (Gibson 2019).

The US-led war on Syria in 2011 presented new separatist opportunities. Peoples Protection Units (YPG) were reactivated in 2012, at first with support from Damascus so that Syrians in the north could fight ISIS. However, the US occupation of parts of north and east Syria in late 2015 led to the reorganization of many YPG units into the US-sponsored ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) (Martin 2018: 96). These were sometimes referred to as a ‘Rojava’ force, while at other times the Kurdish component was played down.

According to one US military report in 2017 the SDF in Manbij was only 40% Kurd (Townsend in Humud, Blanchard and Nikitin 2017: 12), addressing the embarrassing reality that Manbij had a very small Kurdish population. In late 2016 US Col. John Dorrian, gave a higher overall Kurd estimate, saying that the SDF “consists of approximately 45,000 fighters, more than 13,000 of which are Arab” (USDOD 2016). Many of the latter came from the fragments of earlier US proxy militia in Syria.

Syrian Colonel Malek from Aleppo confirmed to me that the bulk of SDF members were always Kurdish, including many from Iraq and Turkey. The size of the non-Kurd and foreigner contingents varied according to the money on offer. A report from the London based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) recognized that both the YPG and SDF ground forces remained largely arms of the Turkish PKK (Holland-McCowan 2017: 10).

The failure of the September 2017 separatist referendum in Iraq dealt a serious blow to the regional project. The KDP and PUK put aside their rivalry to hold an independence referendum (having already pushed for and gained federal status) even though it was not authorized by Baghdad. The proposal was said to have gained 92% approval, but was immediately rejected by the Iraqi Government and Army, which drove Peshmerga forces out of Kirkuk in just a few hours (Gabreldar 2018; ICG 2019). For the first time in decades the Iraqi Army took control of the NE region. Baghdad was showing a political will that had been lacking for many years.

In Syria, US forces did nothing to stop the YPG’s ethnic cleansing of non-Kurds in areas to which they laid claim. In October 2015, the western aligned group Amnesty International accused the YPG (just before the US rebranded them as the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’) of forcibly evicting Arabs and Turkmens from areas they took after displacing ISIS. Amnesty produced evidence to show instances of forced displacement, and the demolition and confiscation of civilian property, which constituted war crimes (AI 2015). Similar accusations had come from Turkish government sources (Pamuk and Bektas 2015) but also from refugees who said that ‘YPG fighters evicted Arabs and Turkmens from their homes and burned their personal documents’ (Sehmer 2015; Al Masri 2015).

However, after the US forces became direct patrons of the SDF in late 2015, a UN commission, co-chaired by US diplomat Karen Koning AbuZayd, continued its quest to place most of the blame for abuses on Syrian Government forces. The Commission accused the YPG/SDF of forcibly displacing communities “[but only] in order to clear areas mined by ISIL”, and of forcible conscription, but “found no evidence to substantiate claims that YPG or SDF forces ever targeted Arab communities on the basis of ethnicity, nor that YPG cantonal authorities systematically sought to change the demographic composition of territories” (IICISAR 2017: 111 and 93).

Nevertheless, in 2018 there were ongoing reports of the ethnic cleansing of Assyrian Christians from US-SDF held areas in NE Syria. Young men in the Qamishli area were reported to have been arrested and forcibly conscripted into Kurdish militia, alongside property theft by those same militias (Abed 2018). In 2019 the SDF were reported to have closed more than 2,000 Arabic-teaching schools in the Hasaka region (Syria Times 2019) and to have shot, killed, wounded and jailed displaced people who were trying to escape from al-Hawl Refugee Camp in South-Eastern Hasaka (FNA 2019). Nevertheless, once US forces created and adopted the Kurdish-led ‘SDF’, Amnesty International and the western media muted their earlier criticisms.

Washington in 2012 had looked favorably on the ISIS plan for a “Salafist principality”, so as to weaken Damascus (DIA 2012). In September 2016 US air power was used to attack and kill more than 120 Syrian soldiers at Mount Tharda behind Deir Ezzor airport, to help the terrorist group’s (failed) efforts to take over and threaten the city (Anderson 2017). But when Russia, Syria and Iraq began wiping out these Saudi clones, USA forces simply rescued their best commanders and replaced ISIS with a Kurdish-led ‘SDF’ (Anderson 2019: Chapters 5 and 7), once again to undermine and weaken Damascus.
But US occupation forces did not wait around to sponsor the ill-fated Rojava project. In October 2019 President Trump gave the order for a partial withdrawal from northern Syria. Former US diplomat Robert Ford had warned in 2017 that the US would abandon the SDF (O’Connor 2017). So, stripped of US military protection and their main source of arms and finance, the SDF was forced to rapidly put together a new alliance with Damascus and Russia, to prevent annihilation by Erdogan’s forces. The Turkish leader saw the Öcalan-led YPG/SDF as a stepping stone to its larger project in Turkey (Demircan 2019).

Western liberals complained the US was ‘betraying’ its Kurdish allies; but they placed too much faith in romantic myths. Ünver (2016), for example, presented separatist Kurds as recipients of unplanned opportunities in Syria’s “civil war” in an “age of shifting borders”, as though the big power were not once again using the ‘Kurdish card’ to divide and weaken both Iraq and Syria. Schmidinger (2018: 13, 16-17) tried to twist Syria’s historic diversity into an argument for the ‘Rojava’ sectarian division – instead of an inclusive unitary state. But, as has been said many times before, imperial powers never have real allies, only interests. Lebanese Resistance leader Hassan Nasrallah told Kurdish separatists in February 2018: “In the end they will work according to their interests, they will abandon you and they will sell you in a slave market.”

Meanwhile, with Washington’s blessing, Erdogan persists with his plan to control large parts of northern Syria, with the aim of settling many of the refugees in Turkey under a Muslim Brotherhood style regime, controlled by sectarian Islamist militia. Retired Syrian Major General Mohammad Abbas Mohammad told me that Turkey’s leader has not given up his ambition of becoming a modern-day ‘Caliph’ of Muslim nations, and is working to colonise Syrian minds with his constant Islamist slogans.

****************

Nevertheless, with the help of its allies, Syria is winning the war. ISIS/DAESH and Nusra are virtually defeated, the ‘White Helmets’ and the Chemical Weapons stunts have been exposed and the Rojava myth has collapsed. But a Washington-driven economic war now targets all the independent countries of the region, aggravating the occupation and the terrorism.

Director of the Syrian Arab Army’s Political Department Major General Hassan Hassan, tells us that the US “has the power to destroy the world, many times over, but it has not been able to turn that power into capabilities.” That is why US wars are failing across the region.

While we are indeed heading for a multi-polar world, he says, we are not there yet. “Syria still faces the unipolar regime”. Erdogan, ISIS, Israel and the SDF are all “puppets” of this dying world order. Authorized by the US, Erdogan still wants to set up a Muslim Brotherhood region in north and east Syria. This is a dying and a “most dangerous” order, General Hassan says. “The US deep state knows that its unipolarity is failing, but that has not yet been announced. The new world system is born, but is not yet recognized. The US wants to prolong this conflict as long as possible, and to punish the Syrian people”.

In that transitional phase we see collaboration between the SAA and the SDF, the extraordinary anomaly of an SDF-run Manbij and the ongoing experiment of ‘Kobane’, the SDF controlled border town which Syrians call Ayn al Arab.

Traveling from rural Aleppo to rural Raqqa on the M4 highway we cross the Furat (Euphrates) river, a huge, semi-dammed expanse of fresh water which appears particularly sweet between two deserts. Turning north we arrive in Ayn al Arab, at the Turkish border, in less than an hour. Although Erdogan’s gangs are attacking Ayn al Issa, deeper inside Syria on the M4, there is no sign of fighting near Ayn al Arab itself. Major General Abbas says that Erdogan is aiming at narrow incursions, which can later be widened.

This small city of perhaps 45,000 people was evacuated during earlier fighting and still shows signs of great destruction, especially on the eastern and northern sides. Less than a tenth of the size of Manbij it is now said to have a majority of Kurds and the SDF comrades seem well organized. We are taken to their small headquarters, a three-story building, to await further security checks and an escort to one of their schools and one of their hospitals.

At the secondary school, as in the headquarters, they seem wary of a foreigner accompanied by an SAA Colonel and a Syrian journalist. That breaks down a little as I ask about their curriculum and the children, who have clearly gone through substantial trauma. The headmaster says they are developing programs to help students deal with their war experiences. The threat is not over, as Erdogan’s troops, including sectarian Islamist gangs, are only a few kilometers to the north.

The Kurdish nationalist curriculum has made a break with the centralized Arabic-based system set in Damascus. The headmaster explains that their syllabus is carried out 60% in the Kurdish language, 20% in Arabic and 20% in English. For children from Arab families the syllabus is 60% Arabic, 20% Kurdish and 20% English. They speak of four ‘nationalities’ in Kobane: Kurd, Arab, Yazidi and Christian. That is how they see it.

The management of the small hospital is also strongly Kurd nationalist. I ask where they get their support and they mention the Americans and some international NGOs. Of course, there is nothing from Ankara. “What about Damascus?” I ask. “Nothing and we want nothing”, says one of the managers.

That may be true for this hospital. However Syrian colleagues tell that most of the health centers in SDF controlled areas still get finance and supplies from Damascus. So not only is their security guaranteed by the Syrian state, so are most of their social services.
It remains to be seen how much Kurdish autonomy will remain, under a final political settlement. Federation is not part of the discussion, it is clear that Damascus sees that as a path which would dismember and weaken the country. While the SAA and the SDF jointly fight Erdogan’s gangs, Damascus has been calling on Arab leaders in the north and north east, who had collaborated with the US occupation force and the SDF, to return to the Syrian Arab Army. On the other side, SDF Commander General Mazloum Abdi opposes incorporation of the SDF into the SAA (Van Wilgenburg 2019) and wants to hold onto as much local administration as possible (Syrian Observer 2019). The continued US presence and sponsorship of SDF units in Hasaka, Qamishli and Deir Ezzor (Ahval 2019), serves to maintain the illusions of autonomy.

In the Russian media there is some pessimism about an SDF-Damascus reconciliation. One observer suggests that “Russia will eventually force most (if not all) of Turkey’s forces to leave Syria … [but Damascus] and the Syrian Kurds have opposing political and military goals that will not be easily reconciled” (Stein 2019).

However, Damascus has some other cards. The YPG/PKK/SDF grew its influence through US sponsorship and, as that declines, other voices in the north, including Kurdish voices, are likely to re-emerge, especially through the constitutional process in Geneva. Major General Abbas points out that there are now dozens of Kurdish parties in the north east (Syria Times 2018). Given the intransigence of the US-dependent SDF, Russia is said to be recruiting Syrian Kurd youth to a rival group (Duvar 2019), which is likely to be incorporated into the SAA.

In my view, there will likely be some accommodation of Kurdish nationalist demands at the cultural and local administrative levels, but alongside efforts to ensure this does not privilege Kurds above other Syrian groups. That should appear in the amended constitution. The old world order is dying and the new one is still being born. In this transitional world, Washington persists with its losing war, to divide and punish the Syrian people.
==================================

References
Abed, Sarah (2018) ‘Kurdish Militias in Northeastern Syria Turn to Kidnapping, Conscription, ISIS-like Tactics’, MintPress, 12 February, online: https://www.mintpressnews.com/kurds-in-conflict-ridden-northeastern-syria-turn-to-kidnapping-conscription-isis-like-tactics/237466/
Ahval (2019) ‘Syrian Kurdish military commander announces SDF deal with Russia’, 2 December, online: https://ahvalnews.com/northern-syria/syrian-kurdish-military-commander-announces-sdf-deal-russia
AI (2015) ‘Syria: ‘We had nowhere to go’ – Forced displacement and demolitions in Northern Syria’, Amnesty International, London, October, online: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2425032015ENGLISH.PDF
Al Masri, Abdulrahman (2015) ‘Is there ‘systematic ethnic cleansing’ by Kurds in north-east Syria?’, Middle East Monitor, 21 June, online: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150621-is-there-systematic-ethnic-cleansing-by-kurds-in-north-east-syria/
Allsop, Harriet (2014) The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris, New York
Anderson, Tim (2017) ‘Implausible Denials: The Crime at Jabal al Tharda’, Global Research, 17 December, online: https://www.globalresearch.ca/implausible-denials-the-crime-at-jabal-al-tharda-us-led-air-raid-on-behalf-of-isis-daesh-against-syrian-forces/5623056
Chomani, Kamal (2019) ‘Oil dispute reignites Baghdad-Erbil tensions’, al Monitor, 29 May, online: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/05/iraq-kurdistan-oil-kirkuk.html
Demircan, Davut (2019) ‘Evidence points to nexus between YPG/PKK’, Andalou Agency 23 October, online: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/evidence-points-to-nexus-between-ypg-pkk/1624238#
DIA (2012) ‘14-L-0552/DIA/288’, Defence Intelligence Agency, Washington, 12 August, online: https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf
Duvar (2019) ‘Russia ‘seeks to build local force from ethnic Kurds to replace SDF’, 24 december, online: https://www.duvarenglish.com/world/2019/12/24/russia-seeks-to-build-local-force-from-ethnic-kurds-in-syrias-northeast-report/
FNA (2019) ‘US-Backed SDF Kills Civilians Trying to Escape Hasaka Refugee Camp’, Fars News Agency, 24 May, online: https://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13980303000377
Gabreldar, Bushra (2018) ‘Kurdish independence in Iraq’, Harvard International Review , Vol. 39, No. 1, Athletic Diplomacy: the intersection of sports and culture (Winter 2018), pp. 7-9
Galbraith, Peter (2019) ‘The Betrayal of the Kurds’, New York Review of Books, 21 November, online: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/11/21/betrayal-of-the-kurds/
Gibson, Bryan (2019) ‘The Secret Origins of the U.S.-Kurdish Relationship Explain Today’s Disaster’, Foreign Policy, 14 October, online: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/14/us-kurdish-relationship-history-syria-turkey-betrayal-kissinger/
Gunter, Michael (1996) ‘The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 224-241
Gürbüz, Mustafa (2016) Rival Kurdish Movements in Turkey, Amsterdam University Press
Hennerbichler, Ferdinand (2012) ‘The Origin of Kurds, Advances in Anthropology, Vol 2 No 2 64-79
Hoffman, Sophia (2016) The Politics of Iraqi Migration to Syria, Syracuse University Press, New York
Holland-McCowan, John (2017) ‘War of Shadows: How Turkey’s Conflict with the PKK Shapes the Syrian Civil War and Iraqi Kurdistan’, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), online: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ICSR-Report-War-of-Shadows-How-Turkey’s-Conflict-with-the-PKK-Shapes-the-Syrian-Civil-War-and-Iraqi-Kurdistan.pdf
Humud, Carla E.; Christopher M. Blanchard and Mary Beth D. Nikitin (2017) ‘Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response’, Congressional Research Service, April 26, online: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/591c08bc4.pdf
Ibrahim, Shivan (2019) ‘Syria’s Kurdish parties do not see eye to eye’, Al Monitor, December 9, online : https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/12/kurds-syria-pyd-national-council-russia-syrian-regime.html
ICG (2019) ‘After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid’, International Crisis Group, Report 199 / Middle East & North Africa 27 March, online: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/199-after-iraqi-kurdistans-thwarted-independence-bid
IICISAR (2017) ‘Human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 July 2016’, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ‘Conference room paper’, 10 March 2017, online: https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Countries/SY/A_HRC_34_CRP.3_E.docx&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1
Kutschera, Chris (1994) ‘Mad Dreams of Independence: The Kurds of Turkey and the PKK’, Middle East Report, No. 189, The Kurdish Experience (Jul. – Aug., 1994), pp. 12-15
Martin, Kevin (2018) ‘Syria and Iraq ISIS and Other Actors in Historical Context’, in Feisal al-Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly (2018) The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications, Brookings Institution Press
Mohannad Al-Kati (2019) ‘The Kurdish Movement in the Arab World: The Syrian Kurds as a Case Study’, AlMuntaqa , Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April/May 2019), pp. 45-61
Najjar, Faray (2019) ‘New front in Syria’s war: Why Manbij matters’, Al Jazzera 16 October, online: www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2019/10/front-syria-war-manbij-matters-191015143157365.html
O’Connor, Tom (2017) ‘’U.S. will lose Syria to Iran and abandon Kurdish allies, former Ambassador says’, Newsweek, 19 June, online: https://www.newsweek.com/us-military-kurds-lose-iran-syria-former-ambassador-627395
Pamuk, Humeyra and Umit Bektas (2015) ‘Turkey sees signs of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Kurdish fighters in Syria’, Reuters, 17 June, online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-turkey-idUSKBN0OW1SA20150616
Schmidinger, Thomas (2018) Rojava: Revolution, War and the Future of Syria’s Kurds, Pluto, London
Sehmer, Alexander (2015) ‘Thousands of Arabs flee from Kurdish fighters in Syria’s north’, The Independent, 1 June, online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/thousand-of-arabs-flee-from-kurdish-fighters-in-syrias-north-10289475.html
Semenov, Kirill (2019) ‘Russia faces Dilemmas in northeastern Syria’, Al Monitor, 21 November, online: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/russia-syria-us-turkey-kurds.html
SOHR (2019) ‘Lens of SOHR monitors the rise of the Syrian flag and the flag of Syriac Military Council affiliated to “SDF”, in Tal Jemma north of Tal Tamr town’, 4 December, Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, online: http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=149576
Stein, Aaron (2019) ‘Temporary and Transactional: The Syrian Regime and SDF Alliance’, Valdai Club, 29 November, online: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/temporary-and-transactional-the-syrian-regime/
Syrian Observer (2019) Russia takes over SDF Base in northern Hassakeh, 2 December, online: https://syrianobserver.com/EN/news/54623/russia-takes-over-sdf-in-northern-hassakeh.html
Syria Times (2018) ‘Syrian officer to ST: forces in Syria’, 31 December, online: http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/editorials/opinion/39606-syrian-officer-to-st-forces-in-syria
Syria Times (2019) ‘SDF militia closes 2154 Syrian schools and gives some of them to US occupation army’, 27 September, online: http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/news/local/43878-sdf-militia-closes-2154-syrian-schools-and-gives-some-of-them-to-us-occupation-army
Tejel, Jordi (2009) Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society, Routledge, New York
Ünver, H. Akin (2016) Schrödinger’s Kurds: Transnational Kurdish Geopolitics in the Age of Shifting Borders, Journal of International Affairs , Vol. 69, No. 2, Shifting Sands: The Middle East in the 21st Century (SPRING/SUMMER 2016), pp. 65-100
USDOD (2016) ‘Department of Defense Press Briefing by Col. Dorrian via teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq’, U.S. Department of Defense, 8 December, online:
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1025099/department-of-defensepress-briefing-by-col-dorrian-via-teleconference-from-bag
Van Wilgenburg, Wladimir (2019) ‘SDF le
leadeadership meets with Arab tribes in response to Damascus call to defect’, Kurdistan24, 11 December, online: https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/09be9fde-3988-4307-be32-ab161da48412
Yildiz, Kerim (2005) The Kurds in Syria: the forgotten people, Ann Arbor, London

Source: Press TV
Russian military police have taken control of a base near Syria’s northern city of Raqqah only a few days after US servicemen left the site, which lies in a strategic area at a crossroads linking the strategic city with the central and northern regions of the war-ravaged country.

Russia’s state-run TASS news agency reported that Russian forces entered the base, a former school building in the village of Tal Samin and located 26 kilometers (16 miles) north of the provincial capital Raqqah, on Thursday.

“By the end of the day, the unit will be stationed and, in a manner of speaking, we will carry out patrols … to protect local civilians starting from today,” Russian military officer Arman Mambetov said after the Russian flag was hoisted above the base.

The development came as Syrian authorities had earlier stated that foreign-sponsored Takfiri militants were using important roads in Tal Samin to transport ammunition and personnel when the area was under US control.

In late October, Washington reversed an earlier decision to pull out all of its troops from northeastern Syria, announcing the deployment of about 500 soldiers to the oil fields controlled by Kurdish forces in the Arab country.

The US claimed that the move was aimed at protecting the fields and facilities from possible attacks by the Daesh Takfiri terrorist group. That claim came although US President Donald Trump had earlier suggested that Washington sought economic interests in controlling the oilfields.

Pentagon chief Mark Esper then threatened that the US forces deployed to the oil fields would use “military force” against any party that might seek to challenge control of the sites, even if it were Syrian government forces or their Russian allies.

Syria, which has not authorized American military presence in its territory, has said the US is “plundering” the country’s oil.

A senior advisor to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said on Wednesday that Damascus plans to file a lawsuit against Washington for plundering the Arab country’s oil resources.

Bouthaina Shaaban said the United States has no right to Syria’s oil, and the Arab country is going to sue it over a plan to steal the oil resources.

Shaaban warned the US of popular opposition and operations against the presence of American troops at Syrian oil fields, and insisted on the exit of all foreign occupiers, whether they are terrorists, Turks or Americans.