By Pepe Escobar
Source: Strategic Culture
Cold War 2.0 has hit South America with a bang – pitting the US and expected minions against the four key pillars of in-progress Eurasia integration: Russia, China, Iran and Turkey.

It’s the oil, stupid. But there’s way more than meets the (oily) eye.

Caracas has committed the ultimate cardinal sin in the eyes of Exceptionalistan; oil trading bypassing the US dollar or US-controlled exchanges.

Remember Iraq. Remember Libya. Yet Iran is also doing it. Turkey is doing it. Russia is – partially – on the way. And China will eventually trade all its energy in petroyuan.

With Venezuela adopting the petro crypto-currency and the sovereign bolivar, already last year the Trump administration had sanctioned Caracas off the international financial system.

No wonder Caracas is supported by China, Russia and Iran. They are the real hardcore troika – not psycho-killer John Bolton’s cartoonish “troika of tyranny” – fighting against the Trump administration’s energy dominance strategy, which consists essentially in aiming at the total lock down of oil trading in petrodollars, forever.

Venezuela is a key cog in the machine. Psycho killer Bolton admitted it on the record; “It will make a big difference to the United States economically if we could have American oil companies invest in and produce the oil capabilities in Venezuela.” It’s not a matter of just letting ExxonMobil take over Venezuela’s massive oil reserves – the largest on the planet. The key is to monopolize their exploitation in US dollars, benefitting a few Big Oil billionaires.

Once again, the curse of natural resources is in play. Venezuela must not be allowed to profit from its wealth on its own terms; thus, Exceptionalistan has ruled that the Venezuelan state must be shattered.

In the end, this is all about economic war. Cue to the US Treasury Department imposing new sanctions on PDVSA that amount to a de facto oil embargo against Venezuela.

Economic war redux

By now it’s firmly established what happened in Caracas was not a color revolution but an old-school US-promoted regime change coup using local comprador elites, installing as “interim president” an unknown quantity, Juan Guaido, with his Obama choirboy looks masking extreme right-wing credentials.

Everyone remembers “Assad must go”. The first stage in the Syrian color revolution was the instigation of civil war, followed by a war by proxy via multinational jihadi mercenaries. As Thierry Meyssan has noted, the role of the Arab League then is performed by the OAS now. And the role of Friends of Syria – now lying in the dustbin of history – is now performed by the Lima group, the club of Washington’s vassals. Instead of al-Nusra “moderate rebels”, we may have Colombian – or assorted Emirati-trained – “moderate rebel” mercenaries.

Contrary to Western corporate media fake news, the latest elections in Venezuela were absolutely legitimate. There was no way to tamper with the made in Taiwan electronic voting machines. The ruling Socialist Party got 70 percent of the votes; the opposition, with many parties boycotting it, got 30 percent. A serious delegation of the Latin American Council of Electoral Experts (CEELA) was adamant; the election reflected “peacefully and without problems, the will of Venezuelan citizens”.

The American embargo may be vicious. In parallel, Maduro’s government may have been supremely incompetent in not diversifying the economy and investing in food self-sufficiency. Major food importers, speculating like there’s no tomorrow, are making a killing. Still, reliable sources in Caracas tell that the barrios – the popular neighborhoods – remain largely peaceful.

In a country where a full tank of gas still costs less than a can of Coke, there’s no question the chronic shortages of food and medicines in local clinics have forced at least two million people to leave Venezuela. But the key enforcing factor is the US embargo.

The UN rapporteur to Venezuela, expert on international law, and former secretary of the UN Human Rights Council, Alfred de Zayas, goes straight to the point; much more than engaging in the proverbial demonization of Maduro, Washington is waging “economic war” against a whole nation.

It’s enlightening to see how the “Venezuelan people” see the charade. In a poll conducted by Hinterlaces even before the Trump administration coup/regime change wet dream, 86% of Venezuelans said they were against any sort of US intervention, military or not,

And 81% of Venezuelans said they were against US sanctions. So much for “benign” foreign interference on behalf of “democracy” and “human rights”.

The Russia-China factor

Analyses by informed observers such as Eva Golinger and most of all, the Mision Verdad collective are extremely helpful. What’s certain, in true Empire of Chaos mode, is that the American playbook, beyond the embargo and sabotage, is to foment civil war.

Dodgy “armed groups” have been active in the Caracas barrios, acting in the dead of night and amplifying “social unrest” on social media. Still, Guaido holds absolutely no power inside the country. His only chance of success is if he manages to install a parallel government – cashing in on the oil revenue and having Washington arrest government members on trumped-up charges.

Irrespective of neocon wet dreams, adults at the Pentagon should know that an invasion of Venezuela may indeed metastasize into a tropical Vietnam quagmire. The Brazilian strongman in waiting, vice-president and retired general Hamilton Mourao, already said there will be no military intervention.

Psycho killer Bolton’s by now infamous notepad stunt about “5,000 troops to Colombia”, is a joke; these would have no chance against the arguably 15,000 Cubans who are in charge of security for the Maduro government; Cubans have demonstrated historically they are not in the business of handing over power.

It all comes back to what China and Russia may do. China is Venezuela’s largest creditor. Maduro was received by Xi Jinping last year in Beijing, getting an extra $5 billion in loans and signing at least 20 bilateral agreements.

President Putin offered his full support to Maduro over the phone, diplomatically stressing that “destructive interference from abroad blatantly violates basic norms of international law.”

By January 2016, oil was as low as $35 a barrel; a disaster to Venezuela’s coffers. Maduro then decided to transfer 49.9% of the state ownership in PDVSA’s US subsidiary, Citgo, to Russian Rosneft for a mere $1.5 billion loan. This had to send a wave of red lights across the Beltway; those “evil” Russians were now part owners of Venezuela’s prime asset.

Late last year, still in need of more funds, Maduro opened gold mining in Venezuela to Russian mining companies. And there’s more; nickel, diamonds, iron ore, aluminum, bauxite, all coveted by Russia, China – and the US. As for $1.3 billion of Venezuela’s own gold, forget about repatriating it from the Bank of England.

And then, last December, came the straw that broke the Deep State’s back; the friendship flight of two Russian nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers. How dare they? In our own backyard?

The Trump administration’s energy masterplan may be indeed to annex Venezuela to a parallel “North American-South American Petroleum Exporting Countries” (NASAPEC) cartel, capable of rivaling the OPEC+ love story between Russia and the House of Saud.

But even if that came to fruition, and adding a possible, joint US-Qatar LNG alliance, there’s no guarantee that would be enough to assure petrodollar – and petrogas – preeminence in the long run.

Eurasia energy integration will mostly bypass the petrodollar; this is at the very heart of both the BRICS and SCO strategy. From Nord Stream 2 to Turk Stream, Russia is locking down a long-term energy partnership with Europe. And petroyuan dominance is just a matter of time. Moscow knows it. Tehran knows it. Ankara knows it. Riyadh knows it.

So what about plan B, neocons? Ready for your tropical Vietnam?

Source: Fort Russ
Updated at 10:05 pm UTC – The US used phosphorous bombs on human targets – a war crime. Putin and Lavrov have called an Emergency Session of the UN Security Council

Updated at 7:51 pm UTC

BREAKING – The General Command of the Army and Armed Forces said that US alliance aircrafts targeted a Syrian Arab Army position in al-Tharda Mountain in the surroundings of Deir Ezzor Airport, at 5 PM on Saturday, causing losses in lives and equipment and clearly paved the way for ISIS terrorists to attack the position and take control of it.

“US alliance aircrafts targeted at 5 PM on Saturday a Syrian Arab Army position in al-Tharda Mountain in the surroundings of Deir Ezzor Airport, causing losses in lives and equipment,” the official SANA news agency quoted the General Command as saying.

“This act is a serious and blatant aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and its army, and constitutes conclusive evidence that the United States and its allies support ISIS and other terrorist organizations,” SANA quoted a Syrian military statement as saying.

“This act reveals the falseness of their claims of fighting terrorism,” it added.

The US-led coalition has yet to comment on the attack.

Confirmed reports were that as many as 65 soldiers were killed in the bombing attack, with over 100 wounded.

This number has just been updated at 7:51 pm UTC to have climbed to nearly 100 killed.

Russia’s official RT news website said the planes were US coalition aircraft that had crossed over from Iraq.

“Sixty-two Syrian soldiers were killed and over 100 injured in the airstrike by the US-led coalition,” it quoted Russia’s Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov as saying, citing information from the Syrian General Command.

“The aircraft which carried out the bombings had entered Syrian airspace from the territory of Iraq. The airstrike against Syrian positions was performed by two F-16 jet fighters and two A-10 support aircraft,” RT quoted the defense ministry in Moscow as saying.

These and similar acts of aggression by the US and of the various terrorist groups operating under the false flag as ‘Syrian Opposition’, and therefore protected under the terms of the fragile 48-hour ceasefire, are sign that the ceasefire has essentially been ended. The ceasefire was agreed by Russia and the United States and came into force on Monday evening and was extended for another two days on Wednesday.

Syria intended to use the short ceasefire to focus away from Aleppo and turn their attention to cleaning up ISIS positions in other parts of the country. ISIS was not formally protected under the ceasefire. The US attack has essentially provided air cover for ISIS terrorists.

It has just been reported that the Syrian Arab Army has responded by bombing the Daesh (ISIS) positions set to capitalize on the US attack.

The airport serves an important strategic position, the Syrian Arab Army having previously been successful in taking it from ISIS.

Source: Sputnik
White House regrets “unintentional loss of life”
An Obama administration official offered an official statement of regret for the loss of life caused by a US-led airstrike against Syrian Army positions in violation of a ceasefire — an attack that led the Russian Foreign Ministry to wonder whether the White House is aiding Daesh.

The Obama administration offered a formal apology for the “unintentional loss of life” after an airstrike conducted against Syrian forces on Saturday killing at least 80 soldiers loyal to the Assad regime.

The airstrike came only five days into the breakthrough ceasefire agreement between the United States and Russia that called for the two parties to coordinate strikes and for the Obama administration to levy more pressure against the so-called moderate rebels to disband from al-Nusra Front terrorists.

The attack was immediately condemned by both the Russian and Syrian Foreign Ministry, but the diplomatic row intensified after the US Central Command released a statement saying that while the airstrike was unintentional, they had previously notified Russia of the intent to strike. Russia vehemently denies the claim that they were notified that a strike was pending against the Syrian Army base in Deir Ez-Zor.

In the statement, the White House also expressed a commitment to adhering to the ceasefire agreement despite the tragic airstrike.

Speaking before the United Nations Security Council during an emergency meeting on Saturday, the United States Ambassador to the international body Samantha Power reiterated America’s apology for the unintentional Syrian military deaths reiterating the word “regrets.”

By Sharmine Narwani
Source: RT
Syrian peace talks have already stalled. The opposition refused to be in the same room as the government delegation, while the latter blamed opposition ‘preconditions’ and the organizers’ inability to produce a ‘list of designated terrorists’.

The UN’s special envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura has now promised talks will reconvene on February 25, but how will he achieve this?

So much has shifted on the global political stage and in the Syrian military theater since this negotiation process first began gaining steam.

In just the past few weeks, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies have recaptured key areas in Latakia, Idlib, Daraa, Homs and Aleppo, and are making their way up to the Turkish border, cutting off supply lines and exits for opposition militants along the way.

While analysts and politicians on both sides of the fence have warned that a ‘military solution’ to the Syrian crisis is not feasible, the SAA’s gains are starting to look very much like one. And with each subsequent victory, the ability for the opposition to raise demands looks to be diminished.

Already, western sponsors of the talks have as much as conceded that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will continue to play a role in any future government – a slap in the face to the foreign-backed Syrian opposition that have demanded his exit.

And the long list of deliverables in peace talks yet to come – transitional governance, ceasefires, constitutional reform, and elections – are broad concepts, vague enough to be shaped to advantage by the dominant military power on the ground.

The shaping of post-conflict political landscapes invariably falls to the victor – not the vanquished. And right now, Geneva looks to be the place where this may happen, under the watch of many of the states that once threw their weight – weapons, money, training, support – behind the Syrian ‘opposition.’

So here’s a question: As the military landscape inside Syria continues to move in the government’s favor, will a final deal look very much different than the 2011 reforms package offered by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad?
Assad’s 2011 reforms

In early 2011, the Syrian government launched a series of potentially far-reaching reforms, some of these unprecedented since the ascendance of the Baath party to power in 1963.

Arriving in Damascus in early January 2012 – my third trip to Syria, and my first since the crisis began – I was surprised to find restrictions on Twitter and Facebook already lifted, and a space for more open political discourse underway.

That January, less than ten months into the crisis, around 5,000 Syrians were dead, checkpoints and security crackdowns abounded, while themes such as “the dictator is killing his own people” and “the protests are peaceful” still dominated western headlines.

Four years later, with the benefit of hindsight, many of these things can be contextualized. The ‘protests’ were not all ‘peaceful’ – and casualties were racking up equally on both sides. We see this armed opposition more clearly now that they are named Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and ISIS. But back in early 2012, these faces were obfuscated – they were all called “peaceful protestors forced to take up arms against a repressive government.”

Nevertheless, in early 2011, the Syrian government began launching its reforms – some say only to placate restive populations; others saw it as an opportunity for Assad to shrug off the anti-reform elements in his government and finish what he intended to start in 2000’s ‘Damascus Spring.’

Either way, the reforms came hard and fast – some big, some small: decrees suspending almost five decades of emergency law that prohibited public gatherings, the establishment of a multi-party political system and terms limits for the presidency, the removal of Article 8 of the constitution that assigned the Baath party as “the leader of state and society,” citizenship approval for tens of thousands of Kurds, the suspension of state security courts, the removal of laws prohibiting the niquab, the release of prisoners, the granting of general amnesty for criminals, the granting of financial autonomy to local authorities, the removal of controversial governors and cabinet members, new media laws that prohibited the arrest of journalists and provided for more freedom of expression, dissolution of the cabinet, reducing the price of diesel, increasing pension funds, allocating housing, investment in infrastructure, opening up direct citizen access to provincial leaders and cabinet members, the establishment of a presidential committee for dialogue with the opposition – and so forth.

But almost immediately, push back came from many quarters, usually accompanied by the ‘Arab Spring’ refrain: “it’s too late.”

But was it?

Western governments complained about reforms not being implemented. But where was the time – and according to whose time-frame? When the Assad government forged ahead with constitutional reforms and called for a nationally-held referendum to gain citizen buy-in, oppositionists sought a boycott and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the referendum “phony” and “a cynical ploy.”

Instead, just two days earlier, at a meeting in Tunis, Clinton threw her significant weight behind the unelected, unrepresentative, Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Syrian National Council (SNC): “We do view the Syrian National Council as a leading legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change.”

And when, in May 2012, Syria held parliamentary elections – the first since the constitution revamp – the US State Department called the polls: “bordering on ludicrous.”

But most insidious of all the catch-phrases and slogans employed to undermine the Syrian state, was the insistence that reforms were “too late” and “Assad must go.” When, in the evolution of a political system, is it too late to try to reform it? When, in the evolution of a political system, do external voices, from foreign capitals, get to weigh in on a head of state more loudly than its own citizens?

According to statements made by two former US policymakers to McClatchy News: “The goal had been to ‘ratchet up’ the Syria response incrementally, starting with U.S. condemnation of the violence and eventually suggesting that Assad had lost legitimacy.”

“The White House and the State Department both – and I include myself in this – were guilty of high-faluting rhetoric without any kind of hard policy tools to make the rhetoric stick,” confessed Robert Ford, former US Ambassador to Syria.

An analysis penned by veteran Middle East correspondent Michael Jansen at the onset of the talks in Geneva last week ponders the point: “The Syrian crisis might have been resolved in 2011 if US president Barack Obama had not declared on August 18th that year that his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad had to ‘step aside.’”

Were the additional 250,000 Syrian deaths worth those empty slogans? Or might reforms, in Syrian hands, have been worth a try?
Domestic dissent, Assad and reforms

The story inside Syria, within the dissident community, still varied greatly during my January 2012 trip. But with the exception of one, Fayez Sara, who went on to eventually leave the country and join the SNC, Syrian dissidents with whom I met unanimously opposed sanctions, foreign intervention and the militarization of the conflict.

Did they embrace the reforms offered up in 2011? Mostly not – the majority thought reforms would be “cosmetic” and meaningless without further fundamental changes, much of this halted by the growing political violence. When Assad invited them to participate in his constitutional reform deliberations, did these dissidents step up? No – many refused to engage directly with the government, probably calculating that “Assad would go” and reluctant to shoulder the stigma of association.

But were these reforms not a valuable starting point, at least? Political systems don’t evolve overnight – they require give-and-take and years of uphill struggle.

Aref Dalila, one of the leaders of the ‘Damascus Spring’ who spent eight years in prison, told me: “The regime consulted with me and others between March and May and asked our opinion. I told them there has to be very serious reforms immediately and not just for show, but they preferred to go by other solutions.”

Bassam al-Kadi, who was imprisoned for seven years in the 1990s, managed to find one upside to reforms:

Speaking about the abolishment of the state security courts in early 2011, Kadi said: “Since 1973 until last May, it was actually a court outside of any laws and it was the strong arm of the regime. All trials held after abolishing this court have taken place in civilian courts. Sometimes the intelligence apparatus intervenes but in most cases the judge behaves according to his or her opinion. Hundreds of my friends who were arrested in the past few months, most were released within one or two weeks.”

This reform, by the way, took place a mere few months before Jordan’s constitutional reforms added another security layer – the state military courts – for which it was promptly lauded.

Hassan Abdel Azim, head of the National Coordination Committee (NCC) which included 15 opposition parties, took a different view: “Our point of view is that such reforms can only take place when violence stops against protestors…But since the regime tries to enforce its reforms, the result will only be partial reforms that enhances its image but not lead to real change.”

The NCC went on to have a short-lived alliance with the foreign-based SNC which fell apart over disagreements on “non-Arab foreign intervention.”

Louay Hussein who headed the Tayyar movement and spent seven years in prison when he was 22 (and recently as well), told me that January: “We consider Assad responsible for everything that’s happened but we are not prepared to put the country in trouble…In March, we wanted what the regime is giving now (reforms). But when the system started using live bullets we wanted to change it and change it quickly. But after all this time we have to reconsider our strategy.”

And the list goes on. The views ranged from dissidents who “like Assad, but hate the system” to those who wanted a wholesale change that was arrived at through a consultative process – but definitely not foreign intervention. Eighteen months later when I revisited some of these people, their views had transformed quite dramatically in light of the escalation of political violence. Even the ones who blamed the government for this escalation seemed to put their arms around the state, as nationalists first and foremost.

Had the conflict not taken on this stark foreign-backed dimension and become so heavily militarized, they may have expended their energies on pushing at the limits of reforms already on the table.
How can Geneva transform Syria?

First on the table in Geneva is the establishment of a transitional process that gets the two sides working on common governance. On a parallel track, demilitarization is on the menu – which basically consists of organizing ceasefires throughout Syria. The transitional team will then work on hammering out a new constitution, with elections to be held within 18 months.

That sounds a bit like the process already underway in Syria in 2011 and 2012.

Certainly, the opposition believes it has a stronger hand today than back in 2011, supported as it is by the UN-sponsored Geneva process. But the difficulties will start the moment decisions need to be made about which opposition participates in the transitional body, if they can even manage to convince the Syrian government – now racking up military victories every week – that it needs to relinquish a chunk of its authority to this new entity.

It is the kind of ‘opposition’ that eventually enters the transitional process that will help ultimately determine its outcome. Look for some Riyadh- and Turkish-backed opponents to be tossed by the wayside during this process.

With the introduction of Russian air power and qualitative military hardware last autumn, the Syrian army and its allies have gained critical momentum in the field.

So why would the Syrian state backtrack on that momentum to give up authority in Geneva? Even the expectation of this is illogical.

There is a growing consensus among Syria analysts that the Americans have ceded the Syrian theater to the Russians and Moscow’s allies. Washington has barely registered any meaningful objections to Russian airstrikes over the past months, apart from some sound bites about hitting ‘moderate rebels’ and not focusing enough on ISIS.

Part of the US problem is that, without any clear cut Syria strategy, it has found itself neck-deep in this crisis without any means to extricate itself from the uncomfortable dependencies of thousands of rebel militants, and the demands of increasingly belligerent allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

They Russians offer that opportunity – like they did in 2013 by taking the Syrian chemical weapons program off the table – and it looks like Washington is grabbing it with both hands right now. It is likely that Moscow waited to intervene in the Syrian quagmire only when it was absolutely sure the US needed an exit – any earlier, and the Americans were still playing both sides and all cards.

For Geneva to move forward, the participants are going to have to make some awkward commitments. Firstly, the batch of Islamists-for-hire that currently makes up the opposition will need to be finessed – or torn apart – to include a broad swathe of Syrian ethnic groups, sects, political viewpoints and… women.

Secondly, all parties to the talks need to agree on which militants in the Syrian theater are going to make that “terrorist list.” This was a clear deliverable outlined in Vienna, and it hasn’t been done. This all-important list will make clear which militants are to be part of a future ceasefire, and which ones will be ‘fair game.’

After all, there can be NO ceasefires until we know who is a designated terrorist and who can be a party to ground negotiations.

I suspect, however, that this terrorist list has been neglected for good reason. It has spared western rebel-sponsors the discomfort of having to face the wrath of their militants, while allowing time for the Russians and Syrians to mow these groups into the ground. Hence the stream of recent victories – and the accompanying timid reaction from Washington.

As the balance of power shifts further on the ground, we may see a much-altered ‘Geneva.’ Will it genuinely beget a political process, will the players at the table change, will the ‘political solution’ be entirely manufactured behind the curtains… only to be offered up to an unsuspecting public as a victory wrenched from a ‘bad regime?’

Because, right now, Syria would be fortunate to have those 2011 reforms on that table, the rapt attention of the global community encouraging them forward, weapons at rest. A quarter million Syrians could have been spared, hundreds of towns, cities and villages still intact, millions of displaced families in their own homes.

Perhaps Geneva can bring those reforms back, wrapped in a prettier package this time, so we can clap our hands and declare ourselves satisfied.

Sharmine Narwani is a commentator and analyst of Middle East geopolitics. She is a former senior associate at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University and has a master’s degree in International Relations from Columbia University. Sharmine has written commentary for a wide array of publications, including Al Akhbar English, the New York Times, the Guardian, Asia Times Online, Salon.com, USA Today, the Huffington Post, Al Jazeera English, BRICS Post and others. You can follow her on Twitter at @snarwani

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-H4OhVA2T1k

The Economic War on the Syrian Arab Republic

By Jay Tharappel

Syria is being destabilised both militarily and economically. Militarily by insurgent forces sponsored by NATO, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. Economically by the sanctions regime imposed by the United States, the European Union, and even the Arab League.

The Syrian economy has contracted by roughly 35 percent since the beginning of the war. Although the crisis began in March 2011, throughout that year the inflation rate registered at 4.8 percent above the previous year, then in 2012 it jumped to 36.9 percent which coincided with the stronger sanctions imposed in August 2011. In 2013, the inflation rate jumped to 59.1 percent (see appendix).

The corporate media has lamented the humanitarian crisis currently afflicting Syria without addressing the issue of what’s causing it. Often charities and NGOs will encourage donors to send money to refugee camps in neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon, or Turkey. The vast bulk of the humanitarian burden is carried by the institutions of the Syrian state who are currently providing for 5.7 million internally displaced persons.

Often sanctions are justified on the grounds that they’re “targeted” in the sense that they don’t explicitly prevent the export of basic necessities like food. However, what this ignores is that sanctions needn’t directly prevent the trade of basic necessities to make those goods increasingly scarce and unaffordable in the targeted country.

Imposing barriers on trade, especially on financial transactions, increases both the real and perceived ‘sovereign risk’ for entities doing business in that nation, which inexorably undermines the value of that nation’s currency.

The U.S. government has imposed various sanctions on Syria since 1979 which is when Syria was designated a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”. These measures entered a new phase of hostility after the U.S. led ‘War on Terror’.

In 2004 the Bush administration issued the Executive Order 13338, which prohibited the export to Syria of various types of industrial machinery and raw materials crucial for the development of a modern economy. Further sanctions involved blocking the assets of individuals in Syria involved with supporting various resistance organisations in Lebanon and Palestine.

The sanctions regime became even more punitive in August 2011, five months into the beginning of the conflict, when the Obama regime issued Executive Order 13582, which included a whole new range of sanction including most significantly, the prohibition of “the supply…of any services to Syria”.

This has meant financial sanctions, which were encountered first-hand by a member of the Hands Off Syria delegation who was blocked from using PayPal – a U.S. company that enforces these sanctions. PayPal also demanded that the HOS member write to the U.S. government explaining “why the attempted access from Syria was made” and requested confirmation that the “account is not held for the benefit of a person or organization in Syria”.

Given the hegemonic role of U.S. financial institutions in world trade, such sanctions have severely undermined the purchasing power of the Syrian pound. Before the war started the exchange rate was 45 Syrian pounds to the U.S. dollar, which has slid precipitously to what it is now – around 150 Syrian pounds to the U.S. dollar.

Over the course of the conflict the black-market rate soared far and above the official rate, reaching 320 Syrian pounds in July 2013, which was 210 Syrian pounds above the officially set rate of 110 Syrian pounds. The problem was solved by shutting down the operations of currency dealers who were selling their nation’s currency at well below the rate set by Damascus (Khalidi, 2013).

To pay for increasingly expensive imports and to prevent a balance of payments crisis (when imports exceed exports leading to currency depreciation), the Syrian government is forced to export greater quantities of oil which drives up local prices. This source of income however has proven unreliable ever since insurgent forces, namely the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS, gained control the oil fields in the north-east of Syria.

The European Union only lifted these sanctions on imports of Syrian oil once these insurgent forces took over these oil-fields. This in turn fuels the insurgency against the Syrian state via the theft of its resources, and also increases the price of oil domestically.

The collapse in the value of the Syrian pound has also impacted the healthcare system.

Prior to the conflict Syria’s healthcare system was relatively successful compared to other nations in the region. Although Syria has the fourth lowest per-capita GDP when compared with its fellow Arab states, it ranks third highest in life expectancy (at around 74 years) beaten only by the oil rich emirates Qatar and the UAE (World Bank).

Syria’s per-capita expenditure on health amounts to a mere $79, which is relatively low compared to Jordan ($246) and Egypt ($200), however, according to 2008 figures, Syria still managed a lower maternal mortality rate at 46 per 100,000 live births, compared to Egypt and Jordan, at 86 and 59 per 100,000 live births respectively.

The sanctions regime have initiated a reversal of many of these gains. Indeed according to Sen et al (2013, p. 198) writing for the Journal of Public Health and Oxford University:

“Sanctions have prevented the entry of essential medical supplies into the country, including those for cancer, diabetes and heart disease, which are not produced locally and is having an impact upon the thousands dependent upon such medication to treat long-term conditions.”

The sanctions have also forced the government to reverse its price controls on food, which have become increasingly unenforceable given the inflation on inputs determining the price of bread. According to Xinhua News, “the majority of merchants continue to charge high prices, citing the depreciation of the Syrian currency and the difficulty of importing goods into Syria under EU sanctions”.

Given the shrinking economy, the government has been forced to make difficult decisions to bolster the Syria pound under conditions of an economic siege, including reducing state subsidies on bread and fuel, thereby saving the Syrian exchequer approximately $80 million and $365 million U.S. dollars per year respectively according to Syria’s Minister of Domestic Trade Samir Qadi Amin.

According to Xinhua:

“The Ministry of Domestic Trade has doubled the prices of white sugar and rice from 25 Syrian pounds (about 0.17 U.S. dollar) to 50 Syrian pounds (about 0.33 dollar) per kg, and the price of subsidized bread bundle has also been raised from 15 Syrian pounds (0.1 dollars) to 25 pounds (about 0.17 dollars) (Xinhua, 2014).”

When the conflict began foreign exchange earnings from industries such as tourism collapsed as a consequence thereby forcing the government to impose import restrictions on non-essential items to mitigate the depletion of Syria’s foreign exchange reserves (Khalidi, 2011).

Ironically however, because the foreigner-infested insurgency, which is extremely unpopular with the Syrian people, requires a lifeline of foreign funding to survive, such inflows of hard-currency have had the unintentional effect of stabilising the value of the Syrian pound as they travel through the economy eventually their finding their way into the hard-currency reserves of Syria’s central bank.

According to one Damascus based Syrian-banker interviewed by Reuters:

“The dollars which are changed to the pound are going back into the veins of the economy. They get into the economic cycle and in the last resort go to the central bank” (Khalidi, 2014)

In this case it seems the means by which foreign powers sustain the insurgency appears to be undermining their efforts to overthrow the Syrian state – a small victory on the economic front perhaps… 

Appendix

Syria: Economic Indicators (Sourced from DFAT Australia)

 

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
GDP (USD billion) (current prices):	52.6	53.9	60	57.96	47.52	38.97
GDP PPP (Int’l billion):	95.7	102.1	106.9	103.3	84.68	69.44
GDP per capita (USD):	2557	2557	2807	2711.6	2223.5	1823.3
GDP per capita PPP (Int’l):	4648	4841	4997	4827.1	3958.2	3245.7
Real GDP growth (% change):	4.5	5.9	3.4	-3.4	-18.8	-18
Current account balance (USD millions):	-673	-1584	-1709	-5900	-6700	-5900
Current account balance (% GDP):	-1.3	-2.9	-2.8	-10.3	-15	-15.4
Goods & services exports (% GDP):	37.5	29.1	32.7	–	–	–
Inflation (% change):	15.2	2.8	4.4	4.8	36.9	59.1

*Underlined figures have been derived from the GDP growth rates for those years.

2004 Executive Order 13338: In 2004 the U.S. President Bush “declar[ed] a national emergency to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the actions of the Government of Syria”

The United States justified its sanctions on Syria for the three reasons:

1. For “continuing its occupation of Lebanon”, which obstructed the Zionist regime’s objective of destroying the Lebanese resistance spearheaded by Hezbollah.
2. For “pursuing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs”, which the United States would naturally oppose given Syria’s unwillingness to subordinate itself to U.S. interests.
3. For “undermining United States and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq”, referring to Syria’s support for the Iraqi resistance.

The EO states: “the Secretary of Commerce shall not permit the exportation or reexportation to Syria of any item on the Commerce Control List (15 C.F.R. Part 774)”. The exhaustive list includes various types of steel and aluminium, ‘bellow valves’, ‘compressors’, ‘gas blowers’, ‘heat exchangers’, and ‘gas centrifuges’, ‘metal heat-treatment furnaces for tempering metals’, that is, important industrial machinery and raw materials crucial for the development of a modern economy, as well as materials that could potentially be used to build a nuclear reactor; and construction equipment “built to military specifications”.

2005 Executive Order 13338: On the 5^th of April, 2005, the OFAC issued new regulations to implement the which most significantly allows for the blocking of assets held by people within the United States who have “been directing or otherwise significantly contributing to the Government of Syria’s provision of safe haven” to groups such as “Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command”. These measures also extend to those who “have been directing or otherwise significantly contributing to the Government of Syria’s military or security presence in Lebanon”; “have been directing or otherwise significantly contributing to the Government of Syria’s pursuit of the development and production of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles”; and “have been directing or otherwise significantly contributing to any steps taken by the Government of Syria to undermine United States and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq”. Furthermore the measures also extend to anyone who acts on behalf of blocked persons.

2006 Executive Order 13399: Targeted sanctions extended to those accused of being involved in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

2011 Executive Orders 13572 (03/05/2011)and 13573 (18/05/2011) are targeted sanctions against the following entities and persons:

Bashar Al Assad [President of the Syrian Arab Republic, born September 11, 1965]
Maher Al Assad [Brigade Commander of Syria’s Fourth Armored Division]
Farouk Al Shara [Vice President, born 1938]

Mohammad Ibrahim Al Shaar [Minister of the Interior, born 1950]
Ali Mamluk [Former Director of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate]
Atif Najib [Former head of the Syrian Political Security Directorate for Daraa province]
Adel Safar [Former Prime Minister, born 1953]
Ali Habib Mahmoud [Former Minister of Defense, born 1939]

Abdul Fatah Qudsiya [Former Head of Syrian Military Intelligence, born circa 1950]
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun [Former Director of Political Security Directorate, born circa 1952]
Syrian General Intelligence Directorate
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp – Quds Force

2011 Executive Order 13582 (17^th of August, 2011), the following are prohibited:

1. New investment in Syria by a U.S. person, wherever located;
2. The direct or indirect exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply of any services to Syria from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located;
3. The importation into the United States of petroleum or petroleum products of Syrian origin;
4. Any transaction or dealing by a U.S. person, wherever located, in or related to petroleum or petroleum
products of Syrian origin; and
5. Any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a U.S. person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited if performed by a U.S. person or within the United States.

References

Sen, K. Faisal, W. Saleh, Y. (2013), ‘Syria: effects of conflict and sanctions on public health’, Journal of Public Health, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 195–199

Khalidi, S. (2013), ‘Syrian pound jumps after crackdown on speculators’, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/05/syria-crisis-currency-idUSL5N0IQ3GS20131105

Khalidi, S. (2011) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/24/syria-idUSL5E7KO0ZF20110924